



Australian Government
Refugee Review Tribunal

Country Advice

Algeria

Algeria – DZA35742 – GIA – State
protection – Internal relocation

3 December 2009

1 Please provide information on the GIA, including size, structure, mode of operation, and how powerful they are in Bouira.

Country information indicates that the Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique Armé* – GIA) was founded in 1992 with the aim to overthrow the Algerian regime and put in place a state governed by Sharia law. The group emerged as the most violent of the many fundamentalist organisations and it targeted civilians, government workers, police, journalists, feminists and foreigners. Following a ceasefire in October 1997 the GIA fell apart and is now largely defunct. One offshoot of the GIA was the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which became the al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Remnants of the GIA membership are with the AQIM, other groups or have surrendered. No information was found in the sources consulted on the structure of the GIA, its current mode of operation or how powerful it is in Bouira. However, Bouira, together with Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes has been nicknamed the “triangle of death”, traditionally a stronghold for insurgents.

The GIA was founded in 1992¹ and began its activity after the then military government in Algeria suspended legislative elections when the largest Islamic opposition party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was expected to win. The GIA aimed to overthrow the Algerian regime and put in place a state governed by Sharia law². The group emerged as the most violent of the numerous fundamentalist organisations and targeted civilians and government workers, including police, government officials, journalists, feminists and foreigners³. The US State Department reported that almost all the group’s members have joined other Islamist groups or were killed or captured by the Algerian government.⁴

The International Crisis Group reported that following a ceasefire in October 1997 the “GIA fell apart”.⁵ It reported:

¹ International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, p.10 – Attachment 1.

² US Department of State 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group’, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April, Chapt. 6 – Attachment 2.

³ ‘Armed Islamic Group’ in ‘Algeria’ 2009, *Political Handbook of the World Online Edition*, CQ Press Electronic Library

http://library.cqpress.com/phw/document.php?id=phw2009_Algeria&type=toc&num=3 – Accessed 27 October 2009 – Attachment 3; International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, p.11 – Attachment 1; US Department of State 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group’, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, Chapt. 6 – Attachment 2.

⁴ US Department of State 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group’, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April, Chapt. 6 – Attachment 2.

⁵ International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, p.14 – Attachment 1.

The massacres of 1997-1998 precipitated the AIS's [*Armée Islamique du Salut* (Islamic Salvation Army)] decision to end its campaign and accelerated the break-up of the GIA. On 21 September 1997, after secret negotiations with the army over many months, AIS commander Madani Mezrag announced a nation-wide ceasefire effective from 1 October. The fact that families linked to the FIS/AIS had been among the victims of the massacres probably influenced this decision. The ceasefire was a strategic defeat for the FIS, since it meant that the Algerian army had ended the AIS campaign without conceding it a renewed political role. The GIA fell apart: Mustapha Kertali's group at Larba and Ali Benhadjar's LIDD [*Ligue Islamique du Da'wa et du Jihad* (Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad)] soon associated themselves with the ceasefire; Kada Benchiha and his followers quit the GIA to found a new group, "The Guardians of the Salafi Call" (HDS); and in September 1998, the GIA commander in the Boumerdès region, Hassan Hattab, broke away to found the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).⁶

According to Australian National Security information the "GSPC quickly became Algeria's largest and most dangerous terrorist group, and by 2000, the external networks of the GIA across Europe and North Africa had been taken over by the GSPC". In September 2006 it was announced that the GSPC had merged with al-Qa'ida. In January 2007 the GSPC Emir announced that group had changed its name to al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).⁷

A December 2008 news article had emphasised that the GSPC, under the leadership of "Droukdel", had been "recalling the veterans of the GIA, Islamic Armed Group, and entrusting them with terrorist operations that have a media impact".⁸

Various 2008-2009 news articles have also associated former GIA members with other Islamic groups. One news article reported that a "40 year old terrorist", an "old" member of the GIA who belonged to the "Sahara emirate group" of AQIM, had surrendered to Algerian security forces.⁹ A member of the "Protectors of Salafi Call", who was a founder of the GIA, had been killed by the Algerian army.¹⁰ A "60-year-old man", a former "active member" of the GIA, was arrested as part of an al-Qa'ida attempt to blow up the presidential palace.¹¹

The US State Department has reported that the precise numbers of the GIA are not known and that the group "continues to decline".¹² In May 2009 a Council on Foreign Relations source,

⁶ International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July p.14 – Attachment 1.

⁷ Australian National Security 2008, 'Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)', 12 August

http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Salafist_Group_for_Call_and_Combat - Accessed 25 November 2009 – Attachment 4.

⁸ 'Algerian paper says three "terrorists" killed; dissidences within armed group' 2008, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: El Watan website, 22 December – Attachment 5.

⁹ 'Algerian, Malian forces reportedly attack terrorist strongholds in Sahara' 2009, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: EL-Khabar website, 30 September – Attachment 6.

¹⁰ 'Algerian army kills emir of "Protectors of Salafi Call"' 2009, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: Liberte website, 14 September – Attachment 7.

¹¹ 'Algerian security forces foil attack on presidential palace – paper' 2008, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: El-Khabar website, 18 September – Attachment 8.

¹² US Department of State 2009, 'Armed Islamic Group', *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April, Chapt. 6 – Attachment 2.

Lauren Vriens, described the group as “largely defunct”.¹³ In February 2002 the GIA was estimated to have about 100 fighters.¹⁴ At one time the GIA was estimated to have between 2,500 and 10,000 fighters.¹⁵

Information on the GIA’s current mode of operation was not found in the sources consulted. However, Vriens has stated that a trademark of the group was “indiscriminant violence against civilians”.¹⁶

Also, in a 2004 report the International Crisis Group described the GIA in the following terms:

The GIA has distinguished itself since 1993 by its extreme cruelty and savagery and repeated rejection of a negotiated settlement. Unlike the other armed movements, it has attacked civilians indiscriminately, abducting and killing foreigners, planting bombs in public places, slaughtering travellers at false road blocks and committing numerous massacres in villages and townships...¹⁷

In April 2009 the US State Department stated that the GIA’s most recent significant attack was in August 2001¹⁸. Vriens wrote that this was debatable and “some sources” had attributed to the GIA unclaimed attacks up to 2005, although the GSPC was the more likely offender.¹⁹ However, the US State Department also mentioned that the “Algerian press continues to report attacks local people attribute to the GIA”.²⁰ Evidence suggests that these reports could, in part, be a result of the popular and local media interchangability of the terminology for various Islamic extremist groups. Furthermore, it is a reflection that many GIA members have become dispersed amongst still functioning groups such as the GSPC.

In respect of activities of armed groups in Bouira, Hanna Rogan, a PhD candidate at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, presented a paper in March 2009 on violence in

¹³ Vriens, Lauren 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists) (a.k.a. GIA, Groupe Islamique Armé, or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha)’, *Backgrounder*, 27 May, Council on Foreign Relations website <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/> - Accessed 24 November 2009 – Attachment 9.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, p.14 – Attachment 1.

¹⁵ ‘Armed Islamic Group’ in ‘Algeria’ 2009, *Political Handbook of the World Online Edition*, CQ Press Electronic Library http://library.cqpress.com/phw/document.php?id=phw2009_Algeria&type=toc&num=3 – Accessed 27 October 2009 – Attachment 3.

¹⁶ Vriens, Lauren 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists) (a.k.a. GIA, Groupe Islamique Armé, or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha)’, *Backgrounder*, 27 May, Council on Foreign Relations website <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/> - Accessed 24 November 2009 – Attachment 9.

¹⁷ International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, p.11 – Attachment 1.

¹⁸ US Department of State 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group’, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April, Chapt. 6 – Attachment 2.

¹⁹ Vriens, Lauren 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists) (a.k.a. GIA, Groupe Islamique Armé, or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha)’, *Backgrounder*, 27 May, Council on Foreign Relations website <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/> - Accessed 24 November 2009 – Attachment 9.

²⁰ US Department of State 2009, ‘Armed Islamic Group’, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April, Chapt. 6 – Attachment 2.

the Islamic Magreb and named Bouira, together with Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes, as part of an area nicknamed the “triangle of death”.²¹ Rogan stated:

Finally, one of the clearest trends in militant Islamist activity in Algeria during the last eight years is less geographical dispersion... In 2001, violent operations were reported in 36 out of 48 wilayat or provinces. This number has been reduced to 19 wilayat in 2008. Overall, the main region of activity is the populated north, whereas the capital and the vast desert areas in the south have experienced little activity...**In turn, within the North Eastern region, one area stands out with disproportionately high activity. That is the three wilayat of Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdes, and Bouira, that have together been nicknamed the “triangle of death”. In 2008, nearly 70% of all reported incidents took place in the “triangle of death”. This area has traditionally been a stronghold for insurgents in Algeria and it forms zone 2 of GSPC to which the leadership is thought to belong.**²²

Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdas and Bouira are push-pinned on the attached map.²³

2 Please provide information on capacity of state authorities to protect citizens from the GIA.

Although no information was found in the sources consulted on the capacity of state authorities to protect citizens from the largely defunct GIA, sources indicate that the state authorities are making considerable efforts to maintain security and protect against armed groups. Reports between 2006 and 2009 indicate that the authorities were able to provide sufficient protection in the cities against armed groups.

In November 2009 the Coordinator from the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in the context of a testimony to a US Senate Committee relating to AQIM activity, noted that Algeria has in place “effective counterterrorism operations”. Algerian forces are said to “have achieved important successes in breaking up extremist cells and disrupting operations”. However, it was also noted that the AQIM had continued to conduct low-level attacks in the north east of the country.²⁴

Thomas Renard, writing in the September 2008 *Terrorism Monitor*, noted that following bombings in Bouira and Issers (Kabylia) in August 2008 the army had announced a deployment of 15,000 soldiers in Batna, Jijel and Skikda and there were on-going operations in the “triangle of death”. August 2008 was said to have been “one of Algeria’s bloodiest months in recent history”. Also, in Algiers the numbers of police were increased “as 14 new

²¹ Rogan, Hanna ‘Violent Patterns: A Quantitative Study of al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb’, Paper presented at the conference “Understanding Jihadism: Origins, Evolution and Future Perspectives”, Oslo, 19-21 March 2009, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment website, pp.5-6 http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00123/HKS_Hanna_final_123302a.pdf - Accessed 26 November 2009 – Attachment 10.

²² Rogan, Hanna ‘Violent Patterns: A Quantitative Study of al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb’, Paper presented at the conference “Understanding Jihadism: Origins, Evolution and Future Perspectives”, Oslo, 19-21 March 2009, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment website, pp.5-6 http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00123/HKS_Hanna_final_123302a.pdf - Accessed 26 November 2009 – Attachment 10.

²³ ‘Tizi Ouzou, Bourmedas and Bouira’ 2000, *Microsoft Encarta Atlas* – Attachment 11.

²⁴ Benjamin, Daniel 2009, ‘Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities, Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region’, 17 November, Testimony Before Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2009/132082.htm> - Accessed 25 November 2009 – Attachment 13).

police (sic) were opened last month”. Renard also noted that, with tightening security, opportunities for terrorists decreased.²⁵

In April 2009 the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008* it was reported that the response by the police and army to the August 2008 attacks was “energetic”. This response, as well as public disapproval of the number of civilians killed and the increased security presence in major cities could all have contributed to the historically low number of “terrorist incidents” during the “subsequent Ramadan holiday in September [2008]”.²⁶

A later September 2009 news article noted that the army had thwarted “several terrorist attacks” by the group “Salafi Group for Call and Combat”. It continued that according “to observers, the security plan adopted by the army command during the month of Ramadan was “effective and efficient in the field””.²⁷

Earlier, in May 2006 information the UK Home Office provided the following general comments on the protection of persons fearing armed groups:

Sufficiency of protection. Successful operations by security forces helped to eliminate terrorist cells and leaders, weakened terrorist groups, and resulted in significantly lower casualty levels for 2005. The Algerian authorities have shown that they are making considerable efforts towards maintaining security and protecting against terrorists. Security is improving in previous conflict zones and the Algerian authorities have a tight hold on the main cities. In the cities the authorities are able to provide sufficient protection from armed groups.²⁸

In addition, information concerning the return of failed asylum seekers may be of interest. Sources report that failed asylum seekers may draw the attention of the Algerian authorities. Particular concerns have been raised about persons suspected of having links to Islamic movements facing hostile treatment on return to Algeria. It has also been reported that a returnee may face hostile treatment on return due to the authority’s perception that the person may have been involved in terrorism. One source noted that there is probably little danger for returnees who do not generate such suspicions. Information on this issue is in question 8 of the attached RRT Country Advice relating to the treatment of failed asylum seekers returning to Algeria.²⁹

²⁵ Renard, Thomas 2008, ‘AQIM’s Offensive Reveals Shift from Insurgency to Terrorist Tactics in Algeria’, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 6, Iss. 18, The Jamestown Foundation website, 22 September http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5171&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1 - Accessed 2 June 2009 – Attachment 14).

²⁶ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2009, ‘Algeria’ in *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008: Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview*, 30 April – Attachment 15).

²⁷ ‘Several terrorist attacks foiled in Algeria during Ramadan – paper’ 2009, *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, source: Echourouk El Youmi website, 22 September – Attachment 16.

²⁸ UK Home Office 2006, *Operational Guidance Note: Algeria*, 22 May, p.5 – Attachment 12.

²⁹ RRT Country Advice 2009, *Research Response DZA35610*, 18 November, quest. 8/pp.23-26 – Attachment 17.

3 Are there other parts of the country that are safer where the GIA does not have a stronghold?

No information was found in the sources consulted on whether the GIA currently has a stronghold on parts of Algeria. Sources indicate that in 1997-2000 the GIA was strongest in central Algeria. In 2002 it was reported that the group was dispersed in the hinterland of Algiers and a small unit in Sidi Bel Abbes. The most recent information, in February 2007, indicated that the GIA may pose a low-level threat to security/political targets and civilians in the area southwest of Algiers. Although the Algerian government announced in 2006 that the GIA was attempting to rebuild its rural and urban networks, there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. The main threat of the GIA appears to be the dispersal of its members to other Islamic groups in Algeria.

The Political Handbook of the World noted that the group was “broadly accused of the bulk of the terrorist incidents of 1997–2000, most of which occurred in central Algeria, where the group’s influence was considered the strongest”.³⁰ The International Crisis Group states that in February 2002 the GIA had “dispersed across the hinterland of Algiers in small units, plus a small group at Sidi Bel Abbes”.³¹

In February 2007 a Janes Information Group report stated that the GIA “may still pose a low-level threat to civilian and political/security targets southwest of Algiers”:

...depletion of the [GIA] movement’s assets and weaponry has downgraded its potency to the extent that Algerian authorities have announced its termination. Although its numbers and support have been drastically reduced, it may still pose a low-level threat to civilian and political/security targets southwest of Algiers. **In March 2006, the Algerian interior minister announced that the GIA, along with the GSPC, were trying to rebuild their rural and urban networks in the Wilaya of Chlef. These claims have not been substantiated and there is little evidence to suggest that the GIA has been able to rebuild anything. Probably the true threat of the group now lies in the dispersal of its radical cadres into the GSPC both within alternative groups in Algeria and through the diaspora in Europe, although this threat remains limited.**³²

In respect of the area southwest of Algiers, a September 2008 news article described Tissemsilt, Relizane and Sidi Bel Abbes as being the “old fiefs” of the GIA.³³ These areas, southwest of Algiers, are push-pinned on the attached map.³⁴

Of interest is that the US State Department reported that although the Algerian constitution allows for freedom of movement the government restricted this right:

³⁰ ‘Armed Islamic Group’ in ‘Algeria’ 2009, *Political Handbook of the World Online Edition*, CQ Press Electronic Library http://library.cqpress.com/phw/document.php?id=phw2009_Algeria&type=toc&num=3 – Accessed 27 October 2009 – Attachment 3.

³¹ International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, p.14 – Attachment 1.

³² Jane’s Information Group 2007, *Group Islamique Armée (GIA)*, 7 February cited in RRT Country Advice 2008, *Research Response DZA32819*, 17 January, pp.10-11 – Attachment 18.

³³ Security forces break up Islamist recruitment network in western Algeria – paper’ 2008, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: Tout sur l’Algerie website, 8 September – Attachment 19.

³⁴ ‘Tissemsilt, Relizane and Sidi Bel Abbes’ 2000, *Microsoft Encarta Atlas* – Attachment 20.

Under the 1992 emergency decree, the interior minister and the provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons regarded as threats to public order. The government also maintained restrictions for security reasons on travel into the four southern provinces of Ouargla, El-Oued, Laghouat, and Ain-Salah, where much of the hydrocarbon industry and many foreign workers were located. The same decree permits the minister of the interior to place individuals under house arrest. AI reported that the measure was used to assign a residence to individuals already detained in DRS [Department of Information and Security] barracks, thus concealing prolonged arbitrary detention.³⁵

Also, in May 2006 the UK Home Office reported on the internal location of persons fearing armed groups as follows:

Internal relocation. The law provides for freedom of movement and though the government may deny residency in certain districts to persons regarded as threats to public order and maintains some restrictions on travel into the industrial provinces of Ouargla, El-Oued, Laghouat and Ain-Salah for security reasons, freedom of travel within the country is unrestricted. Despite numerous checkpoints it would therefore be possible for the claimant to internally relocate to another region to escape this threat.³⁶

List of Attachments

1. International Crisis Group 2004, *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the page*, Middle East Report No. 29, 30 July, pp.10-14.
2. US Department of State 2009, 'Armed Islamic Group', *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April, Chapt. 6.
3. 'Armed Islamic Group' in 'Algeria' 2009, *Political Handbook of the World Online Edition*, CQ Press Electronic Library
http://library.cqpress.com/phw/document.php?id=phw2009_Algeria&type=toc&num=3 – Accessed 27 October 2009.
4. Australian National Security 2008, 'Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)', 12 August
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Salafist_Group_for_Call_and_Combat – Accessed 25 November 2009.
5. 'Algerian paper says three "terrorists" killed; dissidences within armed group' 2008, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: El Watan website, 22 December. (FACTIVA)
6. 'Algerian, Malian forces reportedly attack terrorist strongholds in Sahara' 2009, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: EL-Khabar website, 30 September. (FACTIVA)
7. 'Algerian army kills emir of "Protectors of Salafi Call"' 2009, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: Liberte website, 14 September. (FACTIVA)

³⁵ US Department of State 2009, 'Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons' in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – Algeria*, 25 February – Attachment 21.

³⁶ UK Home Office 2006, *Operational Guidance Note: Algeria*, 22 May, p.5 – Attachment 12.

8. 'Algerian security forces foil attack on presidential palace – paper' 2008, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: El-Khabar website, 18 September. (FACTIVA)
9. Vriens, Lauren 2009, 'Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists) (a.k.a. GIA, Groupe Islamique Armé, or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha)', *Backgrounder*, 27 May, Council on Foreign Relations website <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/> – Accessed 24 November 2009.
10. Rogan, Hanna 'Violent Patterns: A Quantitative Study of al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb', Paper presented at the conference "Understanding Jihadism: Origins, Evolution and Future Perspectives", Oslo, 19-21 March 2009, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment website, pp.5-6
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00123/HKS_Hanna_final_123302a.pdf – Accessed 26 November 2009.
11. 'Tizi Ouzou, Bourmedas and Bouira' 2000, *Microsoft Encarta Atlas*.
12. UK Home Office 2006, *Operational Guidance Note: Algeria*, 22 May.
13. Benjamin, Daniel 2009, 'Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities, Strategy Across Africa's Sahel Region', 17 November, Testimony Before Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2009/132082.htm> – Accessed 25 November 2009.
14. Renard, Thomas 2008, 'AQIM's Offensive Reveals Shift from Insurgency to Terrorist Tactics in Algeria', *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 6, Iss. 18, The Jamestown Foundation website, 22 September
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5171&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1 – Accessed 2 June 2009.
15. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2009, 'Algeria' in *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008: Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview*, 30 April.
16. 'Several terrorist attacks foiled in Algeria during Ramadan – paper' 2009, *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, source: Echourouk El Youmi website, 22 September. (FACTIVA)
17. RRT Country Advice 2009, *Research Response DZA35610*, 18 November, quest. 8/pp.23-26.
18. Jane's Information Group 2007, *Group Islamique Armée (GIA)*, 7 February cited in RRT Country Advice 2008, *Research Response DZA32819*, 17 January, pp.10-11.
19. Security forces break up Islamist recruitment network in western Algeria – paper' 2008, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, source: Tout sur l'Algerie website, 8 September. (FACTIVA)
20. 'Tissemsilt, Relizane and Sidi Bel Abbes' 2000, *Microsoft Encarta Atlas*.
21. US Department of State 2009, 'Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons' in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – Algeria*, 25 February.